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Abstract
Academic journal editors reject a significant portion of first submissions
without sending them out for peer review. This decision, desk rejection,
is made to reduce the workload on associate editors and referees, to give
the submitting author a head start on revision or pursuit of an alternative
venue, as well as to achieve quicker turnaround time for the journal. Desk
rejection is a judgement based on the manuscript’s perceived quality, im-
pact and fit with the journal’s scope. Could extraneous factors, which are
unrelated to the content of a manuscript, affect the editorial decision? This
paper examines whether the sequential order in which manuscripts are sub-
mitted to a large academic journal affects the editorial decision. Becoming
the first submission on the editor’s list of manuscripts to review increases
the probability of a desk rejection by up to 7% without any effect on the
likelihood of a rejection after peer review.
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1 Introduction
When choosing a potential publication venue, an author considers several factors,
including the manuscript’s fit with a journal’s scope, prestige of a journal, the
perceived likelihood of eventual publication, and the estimated time to receive a
decision on the submission. Editors, especially at journals with large submission
volumes, will seek to reduce the reviewing burden on the associate editors and ref-
erees by rejecting some of the submissions without sending them for a peer review.
This decision, desk rejection, is typically based on a judgement which is made
under some time pressure: the editors usually have additional work commitments
(e.g. teaching or conducting their own research) which limit the time budget for
reviewing the submissions. The editors also have an incentive to make this decision
quickly to improve the journal’s turnaround time, as well as to give the authors
more time for revision and finding an alternative outlet. Given these considera-
tions, it’s possible that the editor’s decision to desk reject a manuscript could be
biased by extraneous factors, factors unrelated to the manuscript’s content.
This paper uses information on all submissions to a large academic journal
during 2009–2013 to explore the potential impact of extraneous factors on edi-
torial decisions. To focus attention on the hypothesis, rather than the journal,
any explicit information identifying the journal has been removed and the jour-
nal will henceforth be referred to as ‘Journal X’ or, if appropriate, ‘the journal’.
Journal X is widely recognised as a leading journal in a broad range of subjects,
occupying top positions in various journal rankings. During the sample period,
the journal received 12 thousand submissions, of which more than 9’500 were first
submissions. Given its wide scope, the journal’s editorial board members are as-
signed to particular subject areas, between 1 and 5 editors per subject area. These
subject-specific editors will be referred to as editors, but where relevant they will
be distinguished from the editor-in-chief. Each editor can make an independent
decision on the manuscript, specifically they can desk reject a manuscript without
additional consultation with the editor-in-chief. The editor can also pass on the
manuscript to an associate editor, who can recommend a rejection or proceeding
with peer review. Depending on the combined judgement of referees, associate
editors, subject editors and the editor-in-chief, the manuscript is either accepted,
2
rejected or sent back for revision.
As the manuscript passes each stage of the review process, there is a greater
scrutiny of its content by multiple individuals who make an independent assessment
of the manuscript’s perceived quality, impact and fit with the journal’s scope. It
is reasonable to expect any extraneous factors to have a smaller effect (if any) at
the later stages of the review. However, the first decision in the review process, to
desk reject or not, involves just one individual who, despite being an expert, is only
human. The editor could suffer from the same behavioural biases as other human
experts, with relevant examples provided in Section 2. The evidence provided
in this paper suggests that the editorial decision to desk reject a manuscript is
influenced by the manuscript’s sequential order, with the manuscripts appearing
earlier in the (imputed) list being up to 7% more likely to be desk rejected. The
analysis includes exploration of several competing explanations for this behavioural
pattern.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 contains a review
of relevant literature. Section 3 describes the available data and provides key de-
scriptive statistics. The empirical strategy for identifying the impact of sequential
order is explained in Section 4. Section 5 presents the main results and Section 6
concludes the paper. Robustness of the results is explored in the Appendix.
2 Related literature
The current paper examines whether the editor’s decision to desk reject is influ-
enced by the order in which manuscripts are presented. There are two related sets
of prior research: the literature on behavioural biases, specifically order effect and
decision fatigue, and the literature on the editorial and peer review processes.
There is empirical evidence on behavioural biases of human experts in multiple
contexts, including high-stake decisions (Danziger et al. 2011; Feenberg et al. 2017;
Berger 2016). One particular bias, order effect, arises from a sequential or a list-
based presentation of available options.
In a recent study, Feenberg et al. (2017) show that the position of a link to
an academic document on an email newsletter has a positive causal effect on the
number of times the article is viewed, downloaded and even cited. Being the top
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item on the list is associated with approximately 30% increase in document views,
downloads and citations (Feenberg et al. 2017). While there are multiple expla-
nations that could generate such outcomes, Feenberg et al. (2017) argue that the
most consistent explanation is offered by a model of skimming, in which the (time-
constrained) readers allocate disproportionate attention to items in prominent po-
sitions. Berger (2016) shows that articles which appear earlier in an academic
journal are cited more frequently and this effect persists over time. Berger (2016)
exploits the alphabetic ordering of the journal’s section to argue that editor’s or-
dering of articles within a section has limited influence on the overall ranking of
the article within the journal. Berger (2016) reports a significant improvement in
citations from being the first article in the journal. Findings by Feenberg et al.
(2017) and Berger (2016) are consistent with earlier research on the importance of
leading positions, see Hamermesh (2017) for further references.
Prior research examined the potential impact of extraneous factors on the peer
review and editorial decisions. A recent study by Kwan et al. (2016) examines
whether presentation order of submitted manuscripts affects editorial decisions
at an academic journal. By analysing almost 650 submissions and their detailed
characteristics, Kwan et al. (2016) reassuringly find that the presentation order did
not have an effect on the final editorial decisions about accepting a manuscript.
However, Kwan et al. (2016) considered only manuscripts that passed peer review,
and which were then discussed in a group setting. This contrasts with the focus
of the present paper on decisions by a single individual, the editor, about desk
rejecting a manuscript.
The editorial decision to desk reject requires a judgement, with incentive to
make it a quick one. McAfee (2010) describes his experience as an editor: “I reject
10–15% of papers without refereeing … If, on reading a paper, I find that there is
no chance I am going to publish a paper, why should I waste the referees’ time
and make the author wait? … The amount of time necessary to establish beyond
a reasonable doubt that a paper is not suitable for a journal ranges from a few
minutes … to many hours”.
Improvement in the speed of first decision can make a journal more attractive
to authors, with a resulting increase in the submission volume. Some editors won-
der if the increased submissions to their journals are going to affect the quality or
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accuracy of editorial decisions (Stewart et al. 2012). One of the questions asked by
Stewart et al. (2012) is whether the editor’s decisions are influenced by the number
of manuscripts submitted on the same day? They report an increased desk rejec-
tion rate on days with large submission volume, specifically the desk rejection rate
is 64% when the editor reviews 1 or 2 manuscripts a day, and it increases to 70%
for 3+ reviewed manuscripts per day. Stewart et al. (2012) provide other evidence
consistent with decision fatigue of the editors, but stop short of a formal investi-
gation of this hypothesis. In a relevant study, Johnston et al. (2007) conducted a
randomized trial to examine if desk rejection would significantly disadvantage the
authors due to potential editorial bias. They find that desk rejections achieve a
significant reduction in the time to decision, without adverse effects on reported
reviewer ratings of scientific impact for accepted manuscripts.
The present manuscript contributes to the literature by showing the impact
of sequential order on the editorial decision to desk reject a manuscript. It also
contrasts predictions of order effect and decision fatigue hypotheses, with evidence
in favour of editorial decision fatigue.
3 Data and descriptive statistics
Data provided by Journal X includes information on all submissions between late
2008 and early 2014. Each of 12 thousand entries in the dataset contains the
computer-generated manuscript ID, date of manuscript submission, the editor’s
decision and its date, as well as the dates of receiving referee and associate editor’s
reports (if any).
The manuscript ID is generated by the editorial software when the author
clicks the submit button and the submission is accepted by the editorial software.1
The ID follows a fixed format of “JX-SEQ-Y.RN”, where JX is abbreviation of
Journal X, SEQ is a numeric sequential code, Y is the year of submission and
RN is the revision number (only applicable to revised submissions).2 The exact
1This and other software-related points were clarified through e-mail exchange with the soft-
ware provider’s technical support team and analysis of their technical documentation.
2The format was changed in 2009 by reordering parts of the manuscript ID and using two-digit
year representation.
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timing of submission is not known, but combining the day of submission with the
sequential component of the manuscript ID allows imputing the order in which the
manuscripts were submitted (see Appendix for robustness of this approach).
The main dependent variable used in this paper is a dummy for a first sub-
mission manuscript that is desk rejected by the (subject) editor. The dummy is
set to 1 for rejected first submission manuscripts if between the submission date
and decision date there were no reports submitted by the associate editor or any
number of reviewers. If a report by an associate editor or at least one reviewer was
submitted then the dummy is set to 0. For robustness, a weaker definition of desk
rejection also includes rejections by associate editor (i.e. no reviewer reports were
submitted). If an associate editor and any number of reviewers submitted a re-
port, then the manuscript is considered to have gone through peer review process,
regardless of the number of reports (and there is no information on their possible
content). Table 1 provides an overview of the editorial decisions, showing the high
rejection rate for the journal — about 80% of all first submissions are rejected.
The editor’s goal is to select the best manuscripts for the limited journal space,
so the manuscripts are judged not only against some journal-specific benchmark,
but also against other submitted manuscripts. When the number of submissions
increases, the editor would like to pick a limited number of ‘the best’ manuscripts,
which implies increased desk rejection rate. However, the editor also has a limited
time budget and might not be able to allocate the same amount of scrutiny when
facing a large inflow of manuscripts. In this case, to avoid mistakingly desk reject-
ing the best manuscripts, the editor can respond by reducing the desk rejection
rate, delegating closer scrutiny to the associate editor and referees. Ultimately,
the limited availability of referees and fixed journal space imply that once the sub-
mission volume reaches a critical level, any editor will respond by increasing desk
rejection rate. Below such critical level, the editor could demonstrate different
behaviour depending on their workload, as well as the journal’s ‘spare capacity’ in
terms of associate editor and referee availability and remaining journal space.
Table 2 shows that actual decisions by editors appear to be consistent with the
limited time budget interpretation: as the number of first submissions (per subject
per day or week) increases, the editors pass on the detailed scrutiny of submissions
to associate editors and reviewers. This broad pattern however masks a significant
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Table 1: Editorial decisions over time and revision cycle.
(a) Decisions on first submissions.
Submission year
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 All years
Accept 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Minor revision 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
Major revision 21 20 17 18 16 15 2 16
Reject 69 54 60 57 60 59 22 56
Desk reject 9 25 21 24 22 23 20 22
No decision 0 0 0 0 1 3 56 4
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
(b) Decisions on all revisions.
First Revision round
submission 1 2 3 4 5
Accept 0 11 50 76 78 100
Minor revision 1 28 32 19 17 0
Major revision 16 32 8 2 0 0
Reject 56 23 6 1 3 0
Desk reject 22 0 0 0 0 0
No decision 4 6 4 1 2 0
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Notes: these tables show editorial decision on first submissions over time or on all submission over revision version;
desk reject is defined as a rejection without requesting referee or associate editor reports; rejection and ‘other’
editorial decisions are conditional on passing the desk rejection stage; ‘other’ editorial decisions are primarily
minor and major revisions (the sample contains fewer than 5 acceptances out of all first submissions).
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Table 2: Decisions at different volumes of first submissions.
(a) By daily volume of first submissions.
Decision type Relative
# of submissions Desk frequency of
per subject per day rejection Reject Other occurence
1 24.0 58.2 17.8 54.9
2 24.6 58.0 17.3 25.5
3 19.8 61.3 18.9 10.8
4 17.9 65.1 17.1 3.4
5+ 7.4 75.3 17.3 5.3
(b) By weekly volume of first submissions.
Decision type Relative
# of submissions Desk frequency of
per subject per week rejection Reject Other occurence
1 25.0 57.0 18.0 8.6
2 24.3 57.7 18.0 13.1
3 29.0 55.7 15.3 14.5
4 25.3 59.3 15.4 14.9
5 21.9 57.1 21.0 11.4
6 24.1 58.6 17.4 7.9
7 20.4 59.3 20.3 9.3
8 23.4 57.7 18.9 5.1
9 16.8 63.3 19.9 4.0
10+ 10.0 72.7 17.3 11.2
Notes: the table shows relative frequency of editorial decisions depending on the number of first submissions per
unit of time per subject between late 2008 and early 2014.
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heterogeneity in editor response to increased first submission volume, see Figure
1. Given that the journal’s subjects are distinct and have non-overlapping pools of
referees, this heterogeneity is not surprising. Also note that the relative frequency
of ‘Other’ decisions (primarily minor and major revisions) remains quite stable
even when the rate of desk rejections declines. This could mean that during
peer review the manuscript is evaluated against some relatively fixed benchmark,
especially since referees typically review only one submission at a time. However,
the data doesn’t contain information on the reviewer recommendations (only dates
of submitted reports), so this pattern can also be explained by the editor accepting
only a given number of the best manuscripts for the limited journal space.
Figure 1: Differences in editor response to increased submission volumes.
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Figure 2 shows the distribution of decision time by various characteristics.
The distributions of decision time are different by decision type, suggesting quite
different underlying processes (esp. presence of peer review). Panels (a) and (b)
show that desk rejections are communicated quickly. Note that the decision on
desk rejection could be taken soon after the submission, while the decision date
could indicate the earliest convenient time that the editor (or her assistant) could
enter the decision into the editorial system. Also note that the differences in
distributions of referee timings in panel (a) are an artefact, since the dates of
referee decisions are entered in the order in which they were received. Panel (c)
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Figure 2: Distribution of review time for first submissions by selected characteris-
tics.
(a) Decision time by reviewer type.
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(c) Decision time by revision round.
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(d) Decision time by decision year.
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shows that the analysis must take into account the stage of submission, since
revised submissions follow quite different time distributions reflecting involvement
of multiple referees, along with the editor and associate editor, at advanced stages
of peer review process. Panel (d) shows that the overall patterns are broadly the
same over the sample period, 2009–2012. Panels (e) and (f) show that there is no
obvious aggregate-level seasonal pattern in the review times.
4 Empirical strategy
Manuscript- and journal-level patterns described in the previous section suggest
that an empirical analysis of editorial decision-making must take into account the
different underlying processes of different stages of peer review. Given the limited
data on submitted manuscripts and individuals involved in the review process, the
analysis will focus on the very first editorial decision — to desk reject a manuscript
or not.
The hypothesis explored in this paper is whether factors other than the submit-
ted manuscript’s content can affect the corresponding editorial decision. Specifi-
cally, does the sequential order in which the manuscripts were viewed by the editor
influence the editor’s decision to desk reject a manuscript?
The order in which manuscripts were viewed by the editor is not known. Given
the importance of priority claim in academic research, as well as the default set-
ting in the editorial software of presenting the manuscripts in order of their receipt,
it’s reasonable to expect that processing of first submissions will be done in the
first-in-first-out sequence (See Appendix for an examination of heterogeneity in
subject-level preferences). The order of submission is imputed from the manuscript
ID and the day of submission. It is not feasible for authors to anticipate or influ-
ence the sequential rank of their manuscript at the time of submission, hence the
manuscript’s actual rank in the list of submissions is an exogenous variable.3
Another important consideration is the frequency with which the editor reviews
the submissions. The journal’s editorial board made a commitment to achieve
3Dietrich (2008) discusses an intriguing possibility of geography-determined bias due to dif-
ferences in time zones, but finds no empirical support for this hypothesis. See Appendix for
additional discussion of the rank exogeneity.
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quick turnaround times, with a specific time limit for (subject) editors to assign
the paper to an associate editor within five days of submission. This means that
the editor is likely to check frequently for new submissions. The default assump-
tion used in this paper is that the submissions are checked on a daily basis, but
alternative frequencies are also explored in Appendix.
Consider first submission of manuscript i to the journal’s subject j which is
reviewed by the editor at time t, and let xij;t be a dummy variable equal to 1 if the
submission is desk rejected and 0 otherwise (regardless of the eventual decision on
the submission). Suppose that the manuscript’s sequential rank (either in terms
of submission time or the editor’s viewing order) is given by Rij;t. Then the causal
impact of sequential order in editorial decision will be tested by estimating the
following logit specification:
Prob(xij;t = 1) =  (+  Rij;t + j;t) ; (1)
where (y) = (1 + exp( y)) 1, j;t captures unobserved heterogeneity4 specific
to subject j at time t, and  is a constant term. A non-zero estimate of  will
indicate that sequential order matters in desk rejection or other editorial decisions
(if the dependent variable is substituted with another dummy). This specification
is the most flexible approach allowing identification of the impact of the sequential
order among all submissions viewed by the editor in subject j at time t.
A linear probability formulation of Equation 1 yields similar magnitude and
significance of rank variables. Additional specifications explore the importance of
the first and last positions in the list. The robustness of results is examined in the
Appendix.
Multiple hypotheses are consistent with a non-zero , but two specific expla-
nations, decision fatigue and order effect, will give different predictions about the
sign of . These predictions will also depend on what is the ‘default’ choice of an
editor when in doubt. The editor could be ‘hard’ and desk reject a manuscript un-
less clearly convinced to do otherwise, this could be especially true in the context
4Hausman specification test suggests that random effects estimation is consistent, but given
the more restrictive identifying assumptions of random effects, estimation uses fixed effects.
However, random effects estimates are very similar in sign and significance, but have a slightly
smaller magnitude, see a sample table included in the Appendix.
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of a journal that is operating at full capacity (there is only a limited journal space
left and there are no spare referees). At the other extreme, the editor could be
‘soft’ and always seek a second opinion (from associate editor or referees) to avoid
rejecting a “Market for lemons” (McAfee 2010; Shugan 2007; Gans and Shepherd
1994).
Decision fatigue predicts that as the editor works through the list of submis-
sions, she exhausts the limited amount of energy and effort. The fatigued editor
is then more likely to choose a default option, a ‘safe’ choice. The ‘hard’ editor’s
 would be then be positive, while the ‘soft’ editor would have a negative one.
Conditional on the editor type, there would be no change in sign as the editor
works through the list.
Order effect predicts that the editor facing a list would allocate dispropor-
tionate attention to prominent positions on the list, such as the top and bottom
positions (Feenberg et al. 2017). The ‘hard editor’ would then be more likely to
reject manuscripts which are not in prominent positions, since she allocates less
time to those manuscripts and hence is more likely to miss an important footnote
or misread a particular figure. A ‘soft editor’5 is also more likely to be in doubt
about manuscripts in non-prominent positions, but by definition of her type she
will avoid desk rejecting such manuscripts and will seek a second opinion from
the associate editor or referees.6 Conditional on the editor type, we would expect
the manuscripts in prominent positions to have the same  compared to other
manuscripts. The sign of  would be negative for a ‘hard’ editor and positive for
a ‘soft’ editor.
These two hypotheses give different predictions about the importance of se-
quential rank. By comparing the estimated  for linear rank, as well as for the
first and last positions, it’s possible to discard one of these hypotheses.
5This term is taken from an interview with QJE editor: https://blogs.worldbank.org/
impactevaluations/qa-with-larry-katz-editor-of-qje.
6Shugan (2007) provides an example of the editorial calculus on p. 594. Assuming, for ex-
ample, that an article in a journal gets two citations on average, “… missing one highly cited
article causes substantial opportunity cost. In this example, publishing one article that gets 300
citations compensates for publishing 149 articles that get zero citations.”
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5 Main results
Equation 1 was estimated for dummies indicating a desk rejection, a weak desk
rejection (i.e. rejection by the editor or associate editor, but without referees),
rejection by associate editor, and rejection by referees.7 Table 3 shows that as a
manuscript’s sequential rank increases, its probability of a (weak) desk rejection
decreases, without any effect on the decision after peer review. Regardless of the
underlying causal mechanism, decision fatigue or order effect, the negative sign
of  indicates that the editors at Journal X are of ‘soft’ type, seeking a second
opinion when in doubt.
Table 3: The role of manuscript’s rank at different stages of the manuscript review.
Probability of rejection by
editor or associate
editor associate editor editor referee(s)
Rank -0.043*** -0.014*** -0.008** -0.008
(0.010) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Observations 1435 2212 1257 916
Groups 550 801 422 330
Min group 2 2 2 2
Avg group 2.61 2.76 2.98 2.78
Max group 35 35 34 25
Notes: *** (p<0.01), ** (p<0.05), * (p<0.1); this table shows marginal effects of the variables estimated using
‘xtlogit, fe’ with bootstrapped standard errors provided in the parentheses (2000 replications); all first submissions
to a particular subject on the same day are grouped together and manuscript rank within the group is imputed
using manuscript ID.
Also note that if the editors were more likely to make a mistake as they work
through the list of submissions, then the average quality of manuscripts they pass
on to the associate editor and referees would decrease with increasing rank. This
would be reflected in a changing sign of the rank variable as the manuscript receives
additional scrutiny from the associate editor and referees. Hence, there is no
evidence of persistent mistakes.
To distinguish decision fatigue and order effect, Equation 1 was estimated
with dummies for the first and last rank. The sign of the dummies in panels (a)
7There is no information on the content of referee recommendations, but it is assumed that
the editor follows their advice. Hence, the referee recommendations can be proxied by the final
decision on the manuscript.
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Table 4: Additional rank measures.
(a) First rank.
Probability of rejection by
editor or associate
editor associate editor editor referee(s)
First rank 0.070*** 0.074*** 0.076*** -0.005
(0.022) (0.018) (0.025) (0.032)
Observations 1435 2212 1257 916
Groups 550 801 422 330
(b) Last rank.
Probability of rejection by
editor or associate
editor associate editor editor referee(s)
Last rank -0.064*** -0.072*** -0.072*** -0.014
(0.022) (0.018) (0.026) (0.029)
Observations 1435 2212 1257 916
Groups 550 801 422 330
(c) Comparing first and last ranks.
Probability of rejection by
editor or associate
editor associate editor editor referee(s)
First rank 0.057 0.047 0.049 -0.036
(0.039) (0.031) (0.039) (0.048)
Last rank -0.016 -0.034 -0.035 -0.039
(0.039) (0.031) (0.041) (0.044)
Observations 1435 2212 1257 916
Groups 550 801 422 330
Difference in coefficients 0.073*** 0.081*** 0.084*** 0.004
Equality test (p-value) 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.907
Notes: *** (p<0.01), ** (p<0.05), * (p<0.1); this table shows marginal effects of the variables estimated using
‘xtlogit, fe’ with bootstrapped standard errors provided in the parentheses (2000 replications); all first submissions
to a particular subject on the same day are grouped together and manuscript rank within the group is imputed
using manuscript ID.
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and (b) of Table 4 suggests that decision fatigue is the more likely explanation,
since for an editor who is influenced by both the first and last positions on a list,
the last ranked manuscript would have the same sign as the first ranked one.8
The two rank dummies are strongly correlated, Spearman correlation is -0.62, so
including both of them increases standard errors and leads to estimates that not
significantly different from zero. However, a formal coefficient equality test in
panel (c) suggests that the first rank is significantly different from the last rank,
which is also consistent with the decision fatigue interpretation.
Robustness of these patterns is explored in the Appendix.
6 Conclusion
The analysis presented in this paper shows that first submissions on a given day
are more likely to be desk rejected. There is no doubt that manuscript’s content
is the primary determinant of editorial decisions, but the sequential order appears
to also matter. Given the evidence on exogeneity of sequential order, at least two
hypotheses are consistent with this behaviour: decision fatigue and order effect.
Decision fatigue hypothesis states that editors are more likely to go with a ‘safe’
decision, such as to seek a second opinion, as they work through the submissions.
Order effect hypothesis suggests that when presented with a list of options, the
journal editors might allocate disproportionate attention to ‘prominent’ positions,
such as the top or bottom items on the list. The evidence presented in this paper
suggests that the editors are prone to decision fatigue, although of course other
explanations could be possible.
The manuscript’s sequential order does not have a persistent effect on the sub-
mitted manuscript, since conditional on passing a desk rejection there is no statis-
tically significant relationship between order and the probability of rejection after
peer review. Desk-rejected manuscripts could, in general, benefit from additional
comments by the associate editors and referees, however there is no guarantee that
the comments would be sufficiently different from the brief message that usually
accompanies a desk rejection. Moreover, some authors might instead prefer receiv-
8Assuming that the first and last positions are the prominent ones.
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ing a quick answer, so that they can seek alternative outlets or have more time for
improving their work.
Editorial decision fatigue suggests that the manuscript review process could
be improved by allocating only a specific number of manuscripts per editor or to
permit a degree of randomisation in presentation order of submitted manuscripts to
the editor. The priority claim is important in academia, so the exact submission
date must continue to be recorded, but modern editorial software can allow for
a randomised presentation order. This wouldn’t have particular advantages (or
disadvantages) to the editor, but would reduce any potential incentive for strategic
timing of submissions. It would also reduce other potential extraneous influences,
for example the geographical bias hypothesis, which could not be tested explicitly
in this paper, suggests that there could be exogenous factors affecting sequential
order of submissions. The impact of extraneous factors which might influence
an author’s exposure to the sequential order effect would be diminished through
randomisation.
For authors, being first might not necessarily be ‘good’. There is no impact on
the ultimate decision on the manuscript, which is the main outcome of interest for
most authors. The authors that prefer feedback to a quick decision, might wonder
if they can time their submission strategically to place it lower on the editor’s list.
However, estimating the likely sequential order of the manuscript upon submission
is difficult, if not impossible, moreover there is no guarantee that a submission early
in the day won’t be appended to the previous day’s submissions, or that the editor
won’t decide to take a few days off and let the manuscripts accumulate. Overall,
the evidence suggests that the time and effort are likely to be more productive if
spent on the manuscript, rather than timing its submission.
More broadly, this research contributes to the literature by providing another
case in which human experts are susceptible to behavioural biases. Involvement of
multiple experts in the review process appears to mitigate the effect of sequential
order, which has implications for organisation of work in list-based or sequential
processing environments. For example, the accuracy and reliability of quick deci-
sions made on job or university admission applications might be affected by the
order in which the applications are reviewed. While ‘peer review’ analogues might
not be feasible in some contexts, involvement of additional independent evaluators
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could be one way of reducing cognitive fatigue. A more thorough examination of
the peer review process and how it reduces the impact of extraneous factors will
require additional data. Such data is recorded and collected by modern editorial
software and, hopefully, will become available to researchers in the future.
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Appendix: robustness of the results
Exogeneity of rank and test for specification errors
A possible explanation for the main results is that there is another variable that si-
multaneously results in a higher rank and a lower quality of submitted manuscript
(in turn leading to higher likelihood of desk rejection). In a different context, Di-
etrich (2008) suggested that geographic location of the submitting authors could
lead to a correlation between their position on a list and other factors affecting
the (perceived) quality of their work. For example, if the journal editor is based
in Kazakhstan, then submissions from Europe or United States, which on average
produce manuscripts of ‘higher quality’ (at least in terms of desk rejection proba-
bility), will be received late in the day. In this case, there would be a correlation
between higher rank and lower likelihood of desk rejection.
The data from Journal X does not have manuscript-specific information, such
as the number of authors, their identities (which could be linked to prior work) or
location. As a result, it’s not possible to control for a geographical bias in ranking.
However, two steps were taken to address this concern.
First, for a small number of manuscripts that were eventually accepted (after
multiple stages of review), it is possible to use the submission and acceptance
dates to match the computer-generated first submission IDs to the Digital Object
Identifiers of published manuscripts. After matching DOI to (accepted) manuscript
ID, it’s possible to examine if the sequential rank on the day of first submission
has any correlation with some proxies for quality — the publication’s citation
count or the number of downloads. Table 5 shows that sequential rank on the first
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submission day is not a predictor of manuscript quality.
Table 5: Bibliometric measures of (published) manuscript quality and the sequen-
tial order on the day of first submission.
Citation and download counts
Citations Downloads
Rank (daily) -0.745 -9.693
(0.486) (7.200)
No. of submissions (daily) 0.060 -0.467 4.851 -1.390
(0.436) (0.255)* (5.684) (2.137)
Rank (daily) = 1 -2.186 1.098
(1.471) (13.319)
N 690 690 690 690
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Subject FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: *** (p<0.01), ** (p<0.05), * (p<0.1); this table shows marginal effects of the variables based on Poisson
estimation similar to Equation 1 but with the dependent variable equal to the citation or download count of the
published manuscript (no longer a logit framework), heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are provided in the
parentheses; time fixed effects include dummies for year, week and day of the week derived from the manuscript
submission date and also dummies for the volume and issue in which the manuscript was published (to capture
potential differences in length of time since the manuscript was published); subject fixed effect is a set of dummies
for the subject area of the assigned editor.
Second step is to test for a potential specification error using a link test. If the
model is properly specified, then the square of the predicted value should have no
explanatory power. This is confirmed using ‘linktest’ command in Stata after the
estimations, all squared predicted values are insignificant. Prediction tables could
not be generated given the fixed effects specification.
Measurement of rank: accuracy of manuscript ID-based ap-
proach
The rank variable is imputed from the manuscript ID-based ordering. This ap-
proach is a good proxy for the time of submission at long time scales, for example
at the annual frequency the correlation between the manuscript ID-based rank and
time of submission-based rank is 0.99 for both Pearson and Spearman correlations.
However, as the time scale gets shorter the accuracy of this approach decreases.
This is caused by the following feature of the editorial software: whenever an au-
thor modifies their submission the original manuscript ID is retained but the date
20
of ’first submission’ is updated to the modification date. For example, if an author
submitted a manuscript in August of 2010 and was assigned ID ‘JX-001-10’, but
decided to modify the submission in January 2011, then their manuscript ID is
retained with the ‘new’ submission date in January 2011.
Since the sequential nature of manuscript IDs is exploited as proxy for the sub-
mission order, such submission modifications introduce noise into the measurement
of rank at high resolution time scales. For example, on a weekly scale, correlation
between time of submission-based and manuscript ID-based ranks is 0.92 for Pear-
son and 0.90 for Spearman. Without knowing the exact submission time it’s not
possible to check how accurate this approach is on a daily scale. However, since
the correlation decreased by about 10% when the time scale increased by a factor
of 50, assuming that the decline in correlation is proportional, the accuracy on a
daily scale is estimated to be well above 0.8 for Spearman correlation. This allows
using the manuscript ID-based approach as a reasonable proxy for the actual time
of submission.
Subject heterogeneity
Submission to different subject fields vary in their volume, some subjects are more
popular and as a result have a larger number of editors to handle the submissions.
To check whether the order effect varies depending on the number of subject ed-
itors, Equation 1 was modified by interacting the subject field dummies Ij with
manuscript rank:
Prob(xij;t = 1) =  ( +   Ij Rij;t + j;t) : (2)
Figure 3 shows the marginal effects for rank measures over different subjects.
There is some heterogeneity in the rank effects, with strong patterns for subjects
with 3–5 editors (subjects 6, 8 and 12). Subjects with 1–2 editors have low sub-
mission volumes, which can partly explain the large confidence intervals. Also,
that the default setting in the editorial software is to sort incoming manuscripts
in the order of submission, but an editor can reverse that order with a single click.
Individual editors that do not need to coordinate with colleagues could have spe-
cific preference in processing the submissions, which would reduce the accuracy of
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Figure 3: Marginal effect of a change in rank.
Subject code=3
Subject code=4
Subject code=5
Subject code=6
Subject code=8
Subject code=12
-.4 -.2 0 .2 .4
Rank First rank Last rank
Notes: this figure shows the marginal effects of rank measures; each marginal effect was calcu-
lating by running ‘xtlogit, fe’ with one rank measure at a time; the sample includes only subjects
with a large number of submissions; thick and thin lines represents 90% and 95% confidence
intervals, respectively.
rank measure (e.g. if the editor checks only once or twice a week).
Measurement of rank: backlog accumulation
Each editor is likely to have their own schedule and time preferences, and hence
daily rank might be an inaccurate measure of the order in which the manuscripts
are viewed due to accumulation of manuscript backlogs. The editor’s typical sched-
ule could vary over the sample period, since the sample spans several academic
terms. To visualise the editorial activity, the decisions on all submissions (includ-
ing revisions) were aggregated to subject field-day level and relative intensity of
activity on any particular day was calculated, see Figure 4. Panel (a) shows that
a large number of editors (to process a larger number of submissions) had activity
spread more evenly over the working week, panel (b) for the subject with just
1 editor shows more concentrated activity. This approach relies crucially on the
number and types of decisions. Panel (c) shows the activity of a specific editor
based on data for published manuscripts. This intensity is based only on decisions
to accept, and hence unlikely to fully capture all of the journal-related activities.
Using this decision activity as a proxy for editor’s activity on processing new
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Figure 4: Intensity of daily activity for selected subject fields and individual edi-
tors.
(a) Subject 8 (5 editors)
Mon Wed Fri Sun
Day of the week
2009w1
2010w1
2011w1
2012w1
2013w1
2014w1
Tim
e
01 5 1015 30 50 100
Share of decisions
(b) Subject 15 (1 editor)
Mon Wed Fri Sun
Day of the week
2009w1
2010w1
2011w1
2012w1
2013w1
2014w1
Tim
e
01 5 1015 30 50 100
Share of decisions
(c) Editor A
Mon Wed Fri Sun
Day of the week
2009w1
2010w1
2011w1
2012w1
2013w1
2014w1
Tim
e
01 5 1015 30 50 100
Share of decisions
Notes: the figures show imputed work patterns of editors based on dates of decisions; light
blue indicates days with no activity (during weeks with at least one active day), coloured lines
correspond to the intensity specified on the legend bar, and white spaces indicate weeks with no
activity; in panels (a) and (b) the activity is based on information on all submissions (including
revisions); in panel (c) activity is derived from accepted manuscript only (due to data limitation).
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submissions, manuscript backlogs were estimated by accumulating first submis-
sions during the editor’s inactive days. The resulting manuscript ranking is highly
correlated with the daily ranking (Ri): Pearson 0.77, Spearman 0.61. It was
expected that this adjusted manuscript ranking would improve estimation for
single-editor subjects, however the rank variable is not significant if the sample
is restricted to single-editor subjects. This could indicate that the decision data is
not an accurate reflection of the timing of first submission review by the editors
at the single-editor subject areas, so the rank variable is measured with a lot of
noise. It could, of course, also indicate that due to the low submission volume the
single editor could have more flexibility in integrating submission review into their
existing work schedule reducing any decision fatigue or order effect.9
Large number of submissions
During the sample period the journal had three special issues and a call for papers
for another one (deadline was beyond the sample period). A potential concern
is that the rank effects could be driven by a number of high-quality submissions
which were prepared in advance and submitted before the deadline. In contrast,
manuscripts of lower quality could be submitted just before or on the deadline.
This would introduce correlation between manuscript quality and imputed rank.
The data doesn’t allow distinguishing a special issue submission from a regular sub-
mission, moreover special issues could include submissions from multiple subjects.
To reduce potential bias caused by these episodes of large submission inflows, two
sample restrictions were checked. The first sample restriction excluded all submis-
sions in the months containing a special issue deadline (excluding submissions on
the deadline day only could bias the sample by excluding potentially lower-quality
submissions). The second sample restriction excluded all submissions on days with
more than 5 submissions. The results from these estimations are consistent with
the main results.
9Variations to the backlog accumulation procedure were also considered, including a model
of editor’s working days that assumed a fixed work pattern within any year-month combination.
For example, if the editor worked on a Tuesday in January 2010, then every Tuesday in that
month was considered to be a working day, even if no activity was observed in the decision data
on that day. These modifications did not lead to any meaningful changes in the estimates.
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Table 6: Restricting the sample to 2–5 manuscripts per day.
(a) Sequential rank.
Probability of rejection by
editor or associate
editor associate editor editor referee(s)
Rank -0.056*** -0.051*** -0.043*** -0.000
(0.014) (0.011) (0.016) (0.020)
Observations 1305 1919 982 736
Groups 542 782 404 312
(b) Comparing first and last ranks.
Probability of rejection by
editor or associate
editor associate editor editor referee(s)
First rank 0.063 0.048 0.045 -0.047
(0.040) (0.031) (0.042) (0.050)
Last rank -0.009 -0.033 -0.039 -0.044
(0.041) (0.032) (0.044) (0.048)
Observations 1305 1919 982 736
Groups 542 782 404 312
Min group 2 2 2 2
Avg group 2.41 2.45 2.43 2.36
Max group 5 5 5 5
Difference in coefficients 0.072*** 0.080*** 0.084*** -0.004
Equality test (p-value) 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.914
Notes: *** (p<0.01), ** (p<0.05), * (p<0.1); this table shows marginal effects of the variables estimated using
‘xtlogit, fe’ with bootstrapped standard errors provided in the parentheses (2000 replications); all first submissions
to a particular subject on the same day are grouped together and manuscript rank within the group is imputed
using manuscript ID; the sample is restricted to observations with at most 5 submissions per subject per day.
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Table 7: Removing submissions during months with a deadline for a special issue.
(a) Sequential rank.
Probability of rejection by
editor or associate
editor associate editor editor referee(s)
Rank -0.061*** -0.050*** -0.035** -0.012
(0.013) (0.010) (0.014) (0.019)
Observations 1239 1798 921 719
Groups 512 729 373 297
(b) Comparing first and last ranks.
Probability of rejection by
editor or associate
editor associate editor editor referee(s)
First rank 0.060 0.035 0.027 -0.023
(0.042) (0.033) (0.045) (0.053)
Last rank -0.014 -0.046 -0.051 -0.014
(0.041) (0.033) (0.046) (0.051)
Observations 1239 1798 921 719
Groups 512 729 373 297
Min group 2 2 2 2
Avg group 2.42 2.47 2.47 2.42
Max group 16 16 14 11
Difference in coefficients 0.074*** 0.081*** 0.078*** -0.009
Equality test (p-value) 0.002 0.000 0.006 0.777
Notes: *** (p<0.01), ** (p<0.05), * (p<0.1); this table shows marginal effects of the variables estimated using
‘xtlogit, fe’ with bootstrapped standard errors provided in the parentheses (2000 replications); all first submissions
to a particular subject on the same day are grouped together and manuscript rank within the group is imputed
using manuscript ID; the sample is restricted to submissions during months when there was no deadline for a
special issue (the data does not allow identifying specific manuscripts submitted for a special issue).
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Random effects specification
Using random effects specification moderates the magnitude of the coefficients,
but sign and significance are similar to the fixed effects specification.
Table 8: Estimation with random effects specification.
(a) Sequential rank.
Probability of rejection by
editor or associate
editor associate editor editor referee(s)
Rank -0.030*** -0.010** -0.001 -0.001
(0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002)
Observations 9278 9278 7016 5294
Groups 6878 6878 5405 4277
Min group 1 1 1 1
Avg group 1.35 1.35 1.30 1.24
Max group 35 35 34 25
(b) Comparing first and last ranks.
Probability of rejection by
editor or associate
editor associate editor editor referee(s)
First rank 0.040*** 0.045*** 0.017 0.016
(0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015)
Last rank -0.004 -0.022* -0.029** -0.016
(0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015)
Observations 9278 9278 7016 5294
Groups 6878 6878 5405 4277
Min group 1 1 1 1
Avg group 1.35 1.35 1.30 1.24
Max group 35 35 34 25
Difference in coefficients 0.044*** 0.067*** 0.045*** 0.031
Equality test (p-value) 0.001 0.000 0.008 0.148
Notes: *** (p<0.01), ** (p<0.05), * (p<0.1); this table shows marginal effects of the variables estimated using
‘xtlogit, re’ with bootstrapped standard errors provided in the parentheses (2000 replications); all first submissions
to a particular subject on the same day are grouped together and manuscript rank within the group is imputed
using manuscript ID; the sample is restricted to observations with at most 5 submissions per subject per day.
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